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THE INVESTMENT COMPANY: A STUDY OF
INFLUENCE AND CONTROL IN THE
MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS
GUY B. MASERITZ*
Growing concentration of economic power among institutional
investors by virtue of their large investments in voting securities of
major American corporations has become of increasing concern. The
Patman Report of 1968,' which deals principally with the existing
influence and control of banking institutions, concludes that these in-
vestments provide the banking community with "enormous potential
power, for good or evil, over important parts of the nation's corporate
structure."' The open-end management investment company (mutual
fund) 3
 is an important institutional investor with a potential for sig-
nificant influence and control in its portfolio companies' The mutual
fund industry's investment in equity securities represents a heavy com-
mitment in the industrial sector. Mutual funds, while accounting for
only 3.3 per cent of total institutional assets in 1967, 5 have been esti-
* B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1959; M.A. in economics, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, 1961; LL.B., University of Maryland, 1966; Attorney with SEC Division of
Corporate Regulation; Lecturer in economics, University of Maryland; Member, District
of Columbia and Maryland Bar Associations.
"The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsi-
bility for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of
the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission." SEC Conduct Regulations at 8.
1 Staff of House Subcomm. on Domestic Finance, Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Commercial Banks and their Trust Activities: Emerging Influence
on the American Economy (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as Patman Report].
2 Id. at 3.
3 A management investment company is, structurally, either open-end or closed-
end. Unlike the latter, the security of an open-end company is redeemable, i.e., upon
presentation to the issuer, the holder is entitled to his proportionate share of the issuer's
current net asset value. The open-end company is commonly referred to as a "mutual
fund."
4 "Portfolio company" refers to a corporation in which the fund has invested.
5 Patman Report, supra note 1, at 19, table 1.
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mated to account for roughly 23 per cent of institutional common stock
holdings.' Since the most important element in determining control of
a portfolio company is the extent of voting securities held by the fund,
the 23 per cent figure is particularly significant. Moreover, the mutual
fund industry has experienced sharp growth during the ten-year period
ending in 1967, in which total net assets increased more than five
times.? This pattern of growth will undoubtedly continue, further en-
hanced by the introduction of the "variable annuity" contract by the
insurance industry, 8 and, perhaps, the "collective investment fund
for managing agency accounts," administered by banks,' both of which
operate essentially the same as a mutual fund. As a result of this an-
ticipated rapid growth and increased share of ownership of the total
outstanding public stock of major industrial corporations, institutional
investors will be under increasing pressure to exercise their right of
franchise on behalf of their shareholders and thus to exert influence
and control over the management of their portfolio companies. The
purpose of this study is, first, to examine the extent of influence and
u SEC, Statistical Series Release No. 2358, table 3 (May 1, 1969). This table is
used with reservation, Among other things, it is not clear to what extent agency accounts
of bank trust companies are reflected in the stockholdings of financial institutions.
7
 Arthur Wiesenberger Services, Investment Companies, Mutual Funds and Other
Types, at 18, table 2 (1968 ed.).
8 A variable annuity plan is one in which an insurance company undertakes to make
a series of payments for the life of the participant or for a term of years, the amount
of which vary in accordance with the investment experience of a common pool of
assets. Twenty-two such plans were registered with the SEC as of June 30, 1968. 34
SEC, Ann. Rep, 113 (1968).
9 Manuel F. Cohen, former SEC Chairman, described the collective investment fund
as consisting of
assets entrusted to a bank by individual investors who enter into the so-called
managing agency agreement, authorizing the bank as agent and manager to
invest their money collectively in a diversified portfolio of securities. Commingled
funds for managing agency accounts, like mutual funds, offer investors the
opportunity to share in the economies of size through the pooling of their funds
and to obtain professional management of a diversified securities portfolio. Since
they are essentially the same as mutual funds the Commission traditionally has
taken the position that investors in bank collective funds for managing agency
accounts ought to receive the same protections under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Investment Company Act of 1940. . .
Hearings on Amendment No. 438 to S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt, 3, at 1297 (1967).
A recently passed bill in the Senate, amending the Investment Company Act, was
reported on as follows:
The provisions of this bill encourage competition in the field of collective invest-
ment and provide full consumer protection by subjecting those banks and savings
and loan associations collective funds known as managing agency accounts,
which are functionally indistinguishable from mutual funds, to full regulation
by the Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as well as the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. (Emphasis
added.)
Report on S. 2224 Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency, S. Rep. No, 184, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969).
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control held by mutual funds based on voting power and representation
on boards of directors, and second, to propose a legal framework
within which investment companies may maintain justifiable influence
over their portfolio companies, particularly those which are major
industrial corporations, without attaining "working control'"° in them.
I. CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER IN MUTUAL FUNDS
The problems accompanying the growing economic power of the
mutual fund industry are common to all financial institutions. The
potential consolidation of large segments of the financial and industrial
sectors in the economy raises the fundamental economic question
whether concentration of business assets will create a market structure
which obstructs effective competition. Market concentration can exist
within a single industry, principally as an oligopoly with three or four
firms constituting the dominant share of the output of a particular
industry, or at the aggregate level involving more than one industry,
exemplified by the conglomerates and one-bank holding companies.'
The financial institution, by acquiring working control in the large
industrial corporations, will represent aggregate concentration at its
highest level, for it will combine the concentration of the financial
institution with the concentration of the major industrial corporations
to create a powerful and wealthy "investment holding company.""
Since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act" in 1890, it has been
recognized that large aggregations of business wealth are incompatible
10
 "Working control," as used in this article, means the power to consistently
implement major policy or operational changes in the company, and is based on a
stock interest in excess of 10 per cent of outstanding shares.
11
 A conglomerate is a corporate structure in which the parent company holds
controlling interest in a number of diversified subsidiary companies representing various
categories of industries.
A one-bank holding company is a holding company, usually formed by a banking
institution, which holds controlling interest in that banking institution and in other
non-banking financial and non-financial activities. The one-bank holding company pre-
sents another aspect of the problem of the financial institution. A.A. Berle describes it
as follows:
[T] -in one-bank holding company, left unlimited, can go in all directions, and
there is no limit. It crystallizes around itself, first, a concentration of financial
power, and, second, a Concentration of industrial power beyond belief in the
United States. There is no question that a one-bank holding company, with the
resources of its bank, with the stockholding power in the bank's trust depart-
ment, and especially if it also acquires control of mutual funds which have
further stock interests, can probably attain control of any corporation in the
country it really wants to get, aside from a few of the very large giants that are
too large. This is already beginning to happen.
Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1969) (statement of A.A. Berle).
12 For an explanation of the investment holding company concept, see p. 12 and
note 58 infra.
13 15 U.S.C. §1 1-7 (1964).
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with an economic system based on an impersonal market for the deter-
mination of prices and output of goods and services, and on a diversity
of buyers and sellers within that market. Current antitrust policy, as
indicated by recent guidelines ." and proposed legislation' is being
directed toward concentration at the aggregate level. Conglomerates,
for example, are allegedly anti-competitive because this structure lends
itself to such practices as reciprocal arrangements, the elimination of
potential competition, and extensive market power." The institutional
investor may also become vulnerable to such charges if it achieves
working control in a number of its portfolio companies.
The problem is magnified many times in the case of large mutual
funds which have substantial equity holdings in numerous major
corporations. Table 1 in the Appendix shows the holdings of the 10
largest mutual funds or mutual fund complexes 17 in voting securities
of the top 100 industrial corporations in the United States." The
position that funds and complexes hold in the voting securities of these
corporations has particular significance. In 1967, the first 100 indus-
trial corporations listed in Table 1, measured on the basis of corporate
assets, accounted for approximately 47.6 per cent of the total assets
of all manufacturing corporations." In 1968 this percentage increased
to 49.3 per cent,2° although, of course, the composition of the top 100
in 1968 has changed somewhat. Likewise, the 10 major funds and
complexes in Table 1 account for approximately 49 per cent of total
net assets held by open and closed-end investment companies at the
1967 calendar year-end.21
14 Address by Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Association, June
6, 1969.
15
 White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, July 5, 1968, BNA Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep., No. 411, pt. II, 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Neal Report].
16 Merger Guidelines, Dept. of Justice, Release 20-25 (May 30, 1968).
17 The fund complex is defined as a group of funds which, while separate legal
entities, are related by either common management, a common advisor, or, as is fre-
quently the case, by both. Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications of In-
vestment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 47 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 SEC Report].
Since the effect of a fund complex structure is to establish a single decision-making
body for all funds in the complex, the fund complex is the appropriate unit for mea-
suring voting strength in a portfolio company.
18 The top 100 industrial corporations are taken from the Fortune Directory of the
500 largest United States Industrial Corporations. Fortune, June 15, 1968, at 188-94.
The selection of funds, complexes and portfolio companies is based on size, as
measured by total corporate assets, and all figures on outstanding shares and fund
holdings have been adjusted to reflect the number of shares as of December 31, 1967.
19 Studies by the Staff of the Cabinet Comm. on Price Stability, 45 (January
1969).
FTC, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, pt. 3, at 11 (October 1969).
21 Arthur Wiesenberger Services, supra note 7, tables 15 & 29, at 104-09, 330-33.
Table 15 contains statistical information for all open-end investment companies in the
United States at the end of 1967 for which information could be obtained. This
represents an overwhelming majority of open-end companies.
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Table 2 in the Appendix summarizes the extent of voting power
held by the top 10 funds and complexes in the top 100 corporations
as of December 31, 1967. These major funds held 10 per cent or more
of the outstanding voting shares in 8 per cent of the top industrial
corporations. One-fourth of these major corporations have 7 per cent
or more of their voting securities held by the top 10 funds and fund
complexes, and more than one-third have 5 per cent or more of their
voting securities so held. Frequently the voting power is concentrated
in less than 10 funds. However, only two of the corporations have
5 per cent or more of their voting securities held by any single fund
or fund complex.
The overall picture for the mutual fund industry at the 1967
year-end does not reveal widespread concentration of voting power
in the top industrial corporations by the major funds. Holdings which
might constitute the minimum for working control by any one fund or
complex are nonexistent," and even the holdings of all 10 funds and
complexes represented in Table 1 exceeded 10 per cent of the out-
standing voting securities in only eight cases.
However, these facts do not negate the potential for the exercise
of significant influence in the major corporations by the top mutual
funds. It is noteworthy that, among large industrial corporations whose
securities are normally widely-held, even a holding of 5 per cent or less
of the outstanding shares might be sufficient to influence management."
The degree of influence that a mutual fund may exert on its portfolio
companies is principally dependent upon two factors: voting power
and representation on the boards of directors. It would be expected,
in the case of mutual funds, that representation on the board of a
portfolio company is tied closely to the extent of voting power. Voting
power in a large publicly-held corporation is derived principally from
the ability to control a relatively large block of voting securities,
which could be cast for or against the existing management on various
issues, including the crucial, although normally routine, matter of
reelecting directors.
A party with less than a majority of the outstanding voting shares
can have a wide range of potential influence, depending principally on:
(1) the holdings in the company's voting securities, as a percentage
of total outstandings shares, relative to the extent of dispersion of the
stock among shareholders, and (2) the financial and technical expertise
and prestige of the stockholder. Of course, in the event of a proxy
contest or tender offer, a holder of substantially less than a majority
vote would have to muster enough support to constitute a majority.
But a holding of even less than ten per cent of the outstanding voting
22 See Table 1, col. A.
23
 1966 SEC Report, supra note 17, at 308.
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securities of a major industrial corporation normally can be used to
exert considerable influence over management," particularly when held
by a prestigious financial institution, such as a major mutual fund,
and substantially greater influence should several funds act in concert.
In this light, the 1967 year-end holdings in the 100 largest industrial
corporations by the 10 largest funds and fund complexes reveal a
substantial basis for the exercise of influence.
In addition, although the mutual fund industry, relative to other
financial institutions, is characterized by a high portfolio turnover, it
is almost certain that the large funds and complexes will increase their
investment position in these major corporations. This will happen
essentially for three reasons. First, these corporations provide the
type of quality, blue-chip investment that attracts mutual funds.
Second, the funds are limited in the number of available alternative
investments. Third, these corporations are making a less than propor-
tional increase in their outstanding shares relative to the demand for
their securities.25
In the light of current concern about the effect on competition
of the aggregate concentration of industry, the discernible movement
of the mutual fund industry in that direction suggests the need to
consider the adequacy of existing legislation to deal with the problems
likely to arise. Much difficulty can be avoided by the introduction of
prophylactic measures before anti-competitive concentration occurs.
In devising a statutory scheme, however, care must be taken not to
deprive the mutual funds of a legitimate level of influence in their
portfolio companies. It should be recognized that the presence of the
institutional investor in the American economy may contribute signifi-
cantly to the growth and development of the free enterprise system.
Banks and insurance companies have been a major source of capital
for American industry. In addition, by virtue of their size, the skill
of their managers, and their fiduciary duties, the investment companies
and other financial institutions could employ their voting strength in
the large publicly-held corporation to add a system of checks and
balances to what is normally, for all practical purposes, an autonomous
corporate structure. The institutions, in performing their fiduciary
duties, can incidentally serve as effective, articulate spokesmen for
all public investors.
Statutes relevant to the problems under discussion are: (1) the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (hereinafter 1940 Act),' enacted
in part to eliminate the abuses of the so-called "investment-holding
24 Id.
25 For a report of the increase in portfolio holdings of all funds between 1952 and
1958, see Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 406-OS (1962).
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
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company," and (2) the antitrust laws. The remainder of this paper
will examine certain provisions of the 1940 Act and certain new policy
developments in the antitrust field to determine their adequacy in
meeting the problem. Specific statutory recommendations, designed
to permit the mutual funds and other institutional investors to exercise
legitimate influence over their portfolio companies and to serve as a
source of capital without acquiring great concentrations of wealth
and power, will then be made.
II. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 27
Although the 1940 Act does not deal specifically with the problem
of concentration of ownership by mutual funds in their portfolio
companies,28
 it does contain sections that indirectly affect the composi-
tion of a mutual fund's portfolio. Furthermore, the SEC Investment
Trust Study, 29
 which provided the impetus for the enactment of the
1940 Act, deals extensively with this problem, considering it "one of
the most important aspects of the investment company movement,
particularly from the point of view of the national economy!" 30
A. Section 5(b)
Section 5(b) (1) of the 1940 Act defines a diversified management
company as one in which at least 75 per cent of total assets of the fund
must be in cash, cash items or securities, and, as to this 75 per cent
segment, the holdings in any one portfolio company cannot constitute
more than 5 per cent of the total asset value of the fund and not more
than 10 per cent of the outstanding voting securities of such company.
Thus, if a management company opts for classification as a diversified
fund, it is prohibited from investing more than 5 per cent of the 75
per cent segment in any particular company and from holding more
than 10 per cent of the outstanding voting securities of any particular
company. Since approximately 96 per cent of the assets of management
companies are diversified,' this provision is a relatively effective re-
striction on the concentration of ownership in portfolio companies.
There are, however, practical limitations on the effectiveness of
section 5(b) (1). First, the unrestricted 25 per cent segment of a
27 Id .
28 1966 SEC Report, supra note 17, at 307.
29 SEC, Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, pts. 14 (1938-42).
80
 Id., pt. 4, at 1. The SEC study expressed concern for the effects of control upon
investment companies in that concentration of fund assets in a few large holdings would
limit the diversification of risk. Id. at 22. Moreover, there was concern over the effects
of such concentration upon the portfolio companies, because of the possible undesirable
realignment of the capital structure, excessive dividends, and promotion of mergers and
consolidations. Id. at 27-29.
31
 This figure is based on the investment companies listed in Arthur Wiesenberger
Services, supra note 7, and the classification of these companies by the SEC.
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fund's assets can be freely invested in control situations. For a fund
the size of Investor's Mutual, for example, this segment might amount
to three -quarters of a billion dollars. Second, and more important, a
fund can change its classification froth a diversified fund to a non-
diversified fund by simply obtaining the authorization of the holders of
a majority of its outstanding voting securities." A nondiversified
management company, unlike a diversified company, can invest at
least 50 per cent of its assets in one portfolio company." This change
in classification is usually easy to achieve for most fund shareholders
are indifferent to the fund's investment policy as long as the fund is
performing well. If, however, the shareholders of a fund refuse to
approve the change, nondiversification can still be achieved by creating
a new nondiversified fund in the fund complex.
B. Registration Statements
A registered investment company is required to submit to the
SEC a report indicating which of its investments in portfolio companies
are for the purpose of exercising control." "Control" is defined by
the 1940 Act as "the power to exercise a controlling influence over
the management or policies of a company. . . . "315 "Controlling in-
fluence" is determined by examining such factors as voting strength,
representation on the board of directors of the portfolio company,
and the size and prestige of the fund." There is, however, a presump-
tion that a fund does not control a portfolio company when it owns
25 per cent or less of the voting securities of the company." Alterna-
tively, a presumption arises that a fund does control a portfolio com-
pany when the fund owns more than 25 per cent of the voting securities
of the portfolio company."
Although most of the cases in which the SEC and the courts have
had the opportunity to define "controlling influence" have been situa-
tions where the fund has owned more than 25 per cent of the stock
32 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (1) (1964).
33 A non-diversified company, under the 1940 Act, is any management company
other than a diversified company. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-5(b) (2). Tax considerations, not 1940 Act requirements, determine as a practical
matter the 50 per cent limitation on non-diversified companies. A non-diversification
status does not affect the tax benefits available under Subchapter M of the Internal
Revenue Code, as long as, among other things, 50 per cent of the fund's assets are
diversified and 90 per cent of the earnings are distributed. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 851(b)(2),(4).
84 See, e.g., Registration Statement of Management Investment Company, Form
N-8B-1, Item 5(d).
35 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9).
36 See, e,g., In re M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 588 (1941).
87 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (9).
38 Id.
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of the portfolio company," there have been a few cases in which the
fund has owned less than 25 per cent of the stock of its portfolio com-
pany." In In re Intl Bank and Financial Gen. Corp.,41 the SEC
determined that the investment company, which owned only 17.4
per cent of the voting securities of an affiliated company, neverthe-
less controlled the affiliate despite the presumption against control.
The fact that the investment company was the largest single stock-
holder in the affiliated company, and exercised control over the affiliate
through mutual directors and officers, was instrumental in rebutting
the presumption against control." Although the Commission has failed
to formally delineate the standard for overcoming the presumptions,
this case does suggest the factors that should be considered in ascer-
taining whether a fund controls a portfolio company.
There are at least three reasons why the present reporting re-
quirement under the 1940 Act is insufficient to deter mutual funds from
concentrating their ownership in portfolio companies. First, while
disclosure of the intention to control informs the investor of the fund's
policy, it does not actually prevent large concentrated holdings in
major industrial concerns. Second, assuming that disclosure would
deter a fund from acquiring more than 25 per cent of a corporation's
voting securities, the fund could in effect acquire a controlling influ-
ence by owning less than 25 per cent of the voting securities of the
corporation. Finally, the 25 per cent figure applies only to individual
investment companies, so that a fund complex is unaffected by the
restriction.
C. Section 17(d)
In evaluating voting power, there is the additional consideration
that funds or fund complexes may act in concert to influence or control
management of a portfolio company. Section 17(d) of the 1940 Act
and Rule 17(d)-1" require that affiliated parties apply to the SEC for
its approval of any proposed joint arrangement.' For purposes of the
1940 Act, two funds are indirectly affiliated if each of them holds 5
per cent or more interest in the same portfolio company,' and directly
affiliated if they have common management." It appears that an agree-
ment by two funds so affiliated to vote their holdings in a common
89 See, e.g., The Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. 463 (1948); In re M.A. Hanna Co., I0
S.E.C. 581 at 587 (1941).
40 In re Transit Inv. Corp., 23 S.E.C. 415 (1946); In re Intl Bank and Financial
Gen. Corp., 41 S.E.C. 521 (1963).
41 41 S.E.C. 521.
42 Id. at 526-7.
43 17 C.F.R.	 270.17d-1 (1969).
44 For the definition of "joint arrangement," see 17 C.F.R.	 270.17d-1(c) (1969).
45 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3)(A), -17(d) (1964).
46 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (1964). See In re Axe-Houghton Fund A, Inc., SEC
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 3538, 3547 (Sept, 14, 1962; Sept. 28, 1962).
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portfolio company as a block would constitute a joint arrangement
within the scope of 17(d), requiring the filing of an application. It is
unlikely, however, that the SEC would refuse to approve the applica-
tion. The purpose of section 17(d) and rule 17(d)-1 is to prevent
affiliated persons from injuring the interests of stockholders of invest-
ment companies. 47 In passing upon applications, the SEC is primarily
concerned with preventing a fund from participating in the arrange-
ment "on a basis different from or less advantageous than"" that of
the other participant. Where the two participants are funds, both, of
course, are to be protected. It is doubtful whether a mere joint exercise
of voting rights by two funds holding the same equity securities in a
common portfolio company would be considered to be different from
or less advantageous to one of the funds so as to injure the stock-
holders of either fund."
It seems that the SEC could challenge a proposed joint arrange-
ment by two funds to pool their voting power for the purpose of
achieving control of a portfolio company, in light of the broad policy
declared in Section 1 of the 1940 Act:
investment companies are affected with a national public
interest in that, among other things . . . such companies
customarily invest and trade in securities issued by, and may
dominate and control or otherwise affect the policies and
management of, companies engaged in business in interstate
commerce. . . 5°
47 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (1964). SEC v. Talley Indus. Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 405 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
48 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(b).
40
 See SEC v. Talley Indus. Inc., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968); General Time Corp.
v. Talley Indus. Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969);
SEC v. General Tire Corp., 407 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3246
(1969). In this series of three decisions growing out of the attempt of Talley Industries
to take control of General Time Corporation, the Second Circuit affirmed the finding of
the SEC that the plan of Talley and American Investors Fund, Inc., a registered invest-
ment company, to achieve a substantial stock interest in another company constituted a
"transaction in which such registered company .. . is a joint and several participant"
within the meaning of the 1940 Act. SEC v. Talley Indus. Inc., .399 F.2d at 402-3. Talley,
while not an investment company, was an "affiliated person" of the Fund within the
meaning of § 2(a) (3)(B) of the 1940 Act, by virtue of the fact that 9% of its voting
shares was held by the Fund. But the court held that the participation of the Fund did
not appear to be less advantageous than that of its affiliate. Id. at 405. In reaffirming
this in its third decision, the court stated:
[I]t is . . . hard to perceive how the Commission could find that voting by
an affiliate and an investment company under democratic election rules would
amount to participation by the investment company "on a basis different from
or less advantageous than" the affiliate.
SEC v. General Time Corp., supra at 70. Thus it is not likely that the concerted action
of two or more funds will be considered "different from or less advantageous than"
for any of them.
50 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)(3) (1964).
10
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
In addition, section 14(b) authorizes the SEC to investigate the effects
of the size of investment companies on the concentration of ownership
of portfolio companies. 5 ' The Act itself does not regulate or prohibit
such concentration, but it might be argued that prevention of it is one
of the policies implicit in the Act. However, the SEC has recently
indicated that it was not the intention of the SEC or Congress to re-
strict investments of funds in their portfolio companies.' Thus, sec-
tion 17(d) and rule 17(d)-1, regardless of their possible application to
the problem, are ineffective, because of the SEC's position that "the
Act in general imposes no restriction on the capacity of investment
companies to control the enterprises in which they invest.""
D. Interlocking Directorates
Another means through which a mutual fund can exert influence
over a portfolio company is to seek representation on the portfolio
company's board of directors. Two problems arise from such repre-
sentation. First, it might provide the fund, by virtue of its representa-
tion, with a competitive advantage over other investors which do not
have such representation. Second, it may serve as an additional vehicle
for acquiring working control of the portfolio company.
The first problem has been somewhat alleviated by the recent
decisions of the federal courts which interpret Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934" and Rule 10(b)-5" as prohibiting
insiders in a corporation from disclosing material information con-
cerning the corporation's affairs." A fund director sitting on the board
of directors of a portfolio company is held to a high standard of con-
duct with regard to the disclosure of the portfolio company's business
affairs.
The other problem, and the most difficult to solve, is the use by
a fund of representation on a portfolio company's board of directors
to attain working control over the portfolio company. Even if formal
representation on a portfolio company's board of directors were pro-
hibited, a fund could still exercise its voting power as a stockholder
to support a candidate for election to the board who is sympathetic
with the fund's views. The result, in either case, is that the fund will
obtain a voice in the management of its portfolio company.
The 1940 Act does not prohibit fund directors or advisors from
sitting on the board of directors of portfolio companies. Such repre-
sentation may be disclosed at the time of registration or at the time of
51 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (1964).
52 1966 SEC Report, supra note 17, at 307.
53 Id.
54 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
66 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1969).
56 SEC v. Texas Cull Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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filing the fund's annual report." Disclosure in the annual report is not
required, however, unless the fund director's or advisor's principal
occupation has been his position on the board of directors of a corpora-
tion. There is no provision requiring the fund to disclose the director-
ships held by the fund's directors or advisors where the fund merely
has an equity interest in a corporation. Thus, there are no effective
controls regulating the interlocking directorates between mutual funds
and their portfolio companies.
III. ANTITRUST LAWS
The growing equity position of the mutual funds in their portfolio
companies may be indicative of a trend toward the re-emergence of
the so-called "investment holding company." This term was used to
describe the structure of the investment company industry prior to
1940, which was comprised principally of closed-end companies."
This "investment holding company" was partly an investment company
by virtue of its investment of approximately one-half of its assets in
diversified securities, and partly a holding company as to the balance
of its assets, because of its substantial ownership of voting securities
of various portfolio companies, usually representing between 10 per
cent and 50 per cent of the outstanding shares.
Despite its statutory restrictions and its characteristic high level
of portfolio turnover, the open-end investment company, which is the
prevailing investment company structure today, could likewise develop
many of the characteristics of the investment-holding company. As
previously indicated, a diversified fund may invest up to 25 per cent of
its assets and a non-diversified fund may invest up to 50 per cent of its
assets in control situations. Portfolio turnover of the closed-end com-
panies prior to 1940 was very low, which was indicative of a policy
of investing in securities for Long-term gains or control. However, it
is anticipated that the investments of the open-end funds in "blue-
chip" securities will not experience as high a turnover as in the past.
Also, mutual funds are expected to acquire an increasing share of the
outstanding stock of these industrial corporations.
It is also anticipated that the investment company will increas-
ingly resemble the "pure conglomerate." In this structure, the parent
company holds a controlling interest in a number of diverse sub-
sidiaries, which retain most of their operating autonomy. The parent
company, however, through its ownership of controlling interests in
the subsidiaries, is able to formulate the major policies of the subsid-
57 SEC Registration Statement of Management Investment Company, supra note
34, Items 16, 17, 23; Annual Report of Registered Management Investment Company,
Form N-1R, Item 1.11.
58 SEC Investment Trust Study, supra note 29, pt. 4, at 2.
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lades. The investment company may become susceptible to anti-
competitive charges as a "pure conglomerate," at least with respect to
those portfolio companies in which it acquires working control. For
example, there may be reciprocal arrangements in which a diversified
investment company favors a third party with business from one of its
portfolio companies in exchange for the third party's promise to pur-
chase goods from another portfolio company. An additional anti-com-
petitive effect is that the sheer financial strength of a major industrial
concern affiliated with a large investment company might discourage
other industrial concerns from competing in the same market. Such
a market structure may effectively weaken the incentive for vigorous
competition between two or more large portfolio companies affiliated
with a common investment company. A recent Federal Trade Com-
mission study on conglomerates revealed that many of the top 200
industrial corporations are already linked with each other through
management interlocks and corporate joint ventures, as well as by
centralized control of institutional investors." Moreover, in an in-
dustry which is already concentrated, the common large holdings of
the investment company may serve to further weaken the competitive
environment.
The conglomerate structure, as indicated above, is identified with
reciprocal arrangements, the exclusion of potential competition, and
extensive market power. The investment company poses similar anti-
competitive problems, but its structure should be identified with an
aggregation of business wealth far exceeding that of the typical in-
dustrial conglomerate. The institutional investor, by investing a rela-
tively small portion of its assets in as little as 10 per cent of the out-
standing shares of a portfolio company is capable of acquiring working
control of a corporation. By acquiring working control in a number of
large corporations, the institutional investor represents the highest
form of business concentration because it combines the aggregation
of large industrial corporations with the concentration of a large
financial institution.
Attempts to justify the investment company's concentration of
control in its portfolio companies are not very convincing. While the
pure industrial conglomerate may yield some economies in manage-
ment services, advertising expenditures, and capital costs," the invest-
ment company can offer only a reduction of capital costs. This reduction
results from the portfolio company's affiliation with an investment
company willing to extend loans to the portfolio company. Even this
economy should be scrutinized carefully because of the potential for
69 FTC, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, supra note 20, pt. 3, at 37.
60 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 1313, 1330 (1965).
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a conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty in the investment
company's dual role as creditor and residual owner of its portfolio
company. With the development of a holding company structure, other
economies may be available to the investment company, but the sub-
stantial economies arising from common maunfacturing, research and
distribution facilities are clearly not available to this form of corporate
structure.
There are social and political ramifications to this potential large-
scale amalgamation of the financial and industrial sectors which should
also be scrutinized. There exists a basic premise that the concentration
of economic power leads to a concentration of political power. This
premise served as the basis for the enactment of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act,6' which, among other things, prohibits corporations
and labor organizations from making direct political contributions of
expenditures. The statute was enacted in its original form in 1907, at
a time when large corporations ... sought and achieved influence and
favorable legislation in state capitals and in Washington. . .''' The
Statute was amended in 1943 to include labor organizations, which
came permanently within its scope in 1947. However, the extensive
loopholes in the present federal statutes have been well documented,"
revealing that the large corporate entities and labor unions may still
wield great influence in the political sphere. Financial institutions al-
ready exert great influence in our economy by serving as a major source
of capital. If these same institutions acquire working control in major
industrial corporations, it is conceivable that the larger financial in-
stitutions could control an even greater segment of the economy than
at present.
Aside from the potential for political influence which such con-
centrated economic structures might entail, there are other elements
in the economy which may also be influenced by business concentra-
tion. The formation of corporate conglomerates has led to a con-
comitant need for labor unions to combine in order to exert greater
pressure in collective bargaining." As bigness in the business sector
is matched by bigness in the labor sector, it will be countered by even
greater bigness in government. The emergence of a business and labor
oligarchy with the associated widespread intervention of government
would be inimical to a free enterprise system and to a political system
61 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1964).
62 Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.T.I.L.
Rev. 1033, 1035 (1965).
63 See Epstein, Corporations, Contributions and Political Campaigns; Federal
Regulation in Perspective, Chapters VI and VII (1968); Haley, Limitations on Political
Activities of Corporations, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 593, 614-18 (1964); Lambert, supra note 59,
at 1039; Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 39-40
(1966).
04 The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
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enmeshed in the concept of diversity and fractionalism of economic and
political power.
Prior to suggesting any statutory amendments to alleviate the
problem of aggregate concentration, it is necessary to examine the
present antitrust laws to determine their applicability to such con-
centrations. There is some authority that they are at least partially
applicable, although antitrust policy, until recently, has not been
directed at economic aggregation generally but at specific mergers
which have been considered anticompetitive. Perhaps the broadest
interpretation of the Sherman Act of 1890" as it relates to the prob-
lem of business concentration was expressed by Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America." In finding a violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the manufacture and sale of virgin
aluminum ingot by Alcoa, Judge Hand expounded on the social impli-
cations of industrial concentration:
Congress .. . did not condone "good trusts" and condemn
"bad" ones; it forbad all. Moreover, in so doing it was not
necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible,
because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a
system of small producers, each dependent for his success
upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great
mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few.
These considerations, which we have suggested only as pos-
sible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to
have been in fact its purposes.
We have been speaking only of the economic reason
which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied,
there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their
economic results."
Mere size was an offense by Alcoa because it acquired an overwhelming
share of the market by means other than superior skill, foresight and
industry." This doctrine was later affirmed in United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp." However, in both of these landmark decisions,
the court was concerned with concentration at the industry level.
Moreover, Judge Hand's interpretation of the legislative history of
65 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
66 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
67 Id. at 427-28.
68 Id. at 429-30.
00 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (1953).
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the Sherman Act, as encompassing broad social policies, has met with
both refutation" and limited application.71
The legislative history of Section 7 of the amended Clayton
Act" also reflects a concern for market concentration, both at the
industrial and aggregate levels." Likewise, the Department of Justice
"guidelines," issued in May, 1968, are directed at both industry-
wide and conglomerate mergers. The guidelines outline the Depart-
ment's standards for opposing corporate acquisitions or mergers under
section 7. The most significant part of the guidelines are those which
deal with horizontal mergers involving direct competitors. Horizontal
mergers will be challenged based on the share of the market held
by the four largest firms in the industry, as well as the share of the
market held by each of the merging firms." While the absolute size
of the merging corporations is not the only factor, there is'a presump-
tion inherent in the provisions that any horizontal merger is anticom-
petitive when the merging firms are part of a highly concentrated
market and represent a certain minimum share of that market. Al-
though in the case of horizontal mergers the anticompetitive effects are
clear, it is implicit in the guidelines that mere size might also consti-
tute a violation of the antitrust laws.
Absolute size of a corporation, however, is a controlling reason for
opposing a merger in the Neal Report" released in May, 1969. The
Report concluded that mergers between very large firms and firms
holding a dominant position in a concentrated industry were "most
likely to have anticompetitive consequences."77 The report recom-
mended that "mergers between very large firms and other firms that
are already leading firms in concentrated markets significant in the
national economy" should be forbidden by statutory enactment." A
"large firm" is defined as one with sales in excess of $500 million or
assets in excess of $250 million for the most recent base year. A
"leading firm" is one which has a market share exceeding 10 per cent
during at least two "base" years and in which the aggregate market
share of any four or fewer firms during the same period was more than
50 per cent, provided that the merging firm is among the four largest
70 Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. Law & Econ.
7 (1966).
71 C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis 107
(1965).
72 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
73 See Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 59-60 (1950) (statement of Representative Celler).
74 Supra note 16.
75
 Supra note 16, at 9.
70 Neal Report, supra note 15.
77
 Id. at 8.
78 Id.
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in the market." The implication of the Neal Report is that mere size
is an offense when a giant corporation merges with a firm in a highly
concentrated industry. The provision of section 7 that requires a
showing that the effect of a merger "may be to substantially lessen
competition" is notably absent. However, the report expressly rejects
the notion that economic concentration has reached a level which
would justify challenging mergers on the basis of social policy.
The concepts set forth in the Neal Report are apparently reflected
in large measure in the current policy of the Justice Department. At-
torney General Mitchell, in a June, 1969 address, stated:
The Department of Justice may very well oppose any merger
among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of compa-
rable size in other industries . . . [and] will probably oppose
any merger by one of the top 200 manufacturing firms of any
leading producer in any concentrated industry."
This statement reflects an extension of the policy of the Neal Report,
in that any merger among the top 200 manufacturing concerns will
be opposed, regardless of whether one of the merging companies is a
leading firm in a concentrated industry. Moreover, the top corporations
in other industries, presumably including financial institutions, are
within the prohibition. The test is size, although the prohibitions are
aimed at the anticipated anticompetitive effects of such size. In this
regard, the new policy represents a significant departure from previous
antitrust policy. The Department of Justice guidelines of 1968 and
1969, and the Neal Report together reveal a new awareness by prac-
titioners and regulators that a market structure composed of high
aggregations of business assets is inherently anticompetitive.
The Neal Report does not examine the problem of aggregate
concentration within the context of .the investment company. However,
one provision of the proposed "Merger Act" in the Report has partic-
ular applicability to this issue. Section 1, entitled "Prohibited Acquisi-
tions," contains the following subsection:
This section shall not apply to firms acquiring any equity
security solely for investment and not using the same by
voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring
about control of firms in which any equity security is ac-
quired.'
This provision is significant because of its implied recognition that
"investment" in equity securities does not preclude the voting stock
79 Id. at 16.
80
 Address by Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6, 1969.
81 Neal Report, supra note 15, at 15.
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from being used for purposes of acquiring control. Under this provi-
sion, a stock acquisition is exempt from the prohibitions of the statute
only if there is both (1) an investment and (2) an absence of an
intention to acquire control. Similarly, in United States v. E.I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 82 the Supreme Court held, in connection with the
23 per cent stock interest held by DuPont in General Motors, that
"even when the purchase [of stock] is solely for investment, the plain
language of § 7 contemplates an action at any time the stock is used to
bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening
of competition."83
In summary, the objections to size that were raised by Learned
Hand, in connection with industry-wide concentration, apply with even
greater force to aggregate concentration as represented by the invest-
ment company. The defense of efficiency resulting from economies of
size, which Judge Hand recognized as the only valid economic justifica-
tion for very large corporate structures, appears to have little ap-
plicability to the investment company. The antitrust policy reflected
in the Neal Report and in the Justice Department's guidelines finds
further suport in the doctrine of Judge Hand. This policy will serve as
the statutory framework for proposed legislation to deal specifically
with the problems of the institutional investor.
IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
There are several legislative approaches that might be taken to
prevent domination by financial institutions of the industrial sector
of the economy while at the same time protecting the legitimate exer-
cise of influence by these institutions. Legislation could be directed
at each type of financial institution by amending those federal statutes
which govern them, such as the 1940 Act for investment companies
and the Banking Act of 1933" for bank trust companies. The basic
problem, however, undue economic concentration, is common to all
financial institutions. It is essentially an antitrust problem.
Another alternative, therefore, is to amend Section 7 of the
Clayton Acts' to include the provisions of the proposed "Merger Act"
of the Neal Report. The prohibitions of section 7 would clearly reach
all of the financial institutions in light of United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank." There the Supreme Court held that "[B]y its
terms, the present § 7 reaches acquisitions of corporate stock or share
capital by any corporation engaged in commerce. . • ." 87 "It is un-
82 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
83 Id. at 597-98.
84 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 39 U.S.C. (1964)).
85 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
88 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see also United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171
(1968); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
87 Id. at 335-36.
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questioned that the stock-acquisition provision of § 7 embraces every
corporation engaged in commerce, including banks."88 Moreover, the
Court acknowledged that
Congress' principal concern was with the activities of holding
companies, and specifically with the practice whereby cor-
porations secretly acquired control of their competitors by
purchasing the stock of those companies."
There is little question, then, that section 7 would apply to the
"investment-holding company" and other "quasi-holding company"
structures. However, there is an inherent weakness in section 7 because
it prohibits only those mergers which may tend substantially to lessen
competition. It does not reach mergers where the adverse effects on
competition are likely to occur but cannot be readily predicted." This
is the principal reason given by the Neal Report for the need for
separate legislation. What is required is an "incipiency statute," i.e.,
one which would prohibit a stock acquisition which, by its very nature,
is likely to have an anticompetitive effect or a previous acquisition
which "threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect.'
With the addition of certain provisions, the proposed "Merger
Act" of the Neal Report could well serve as the statutory framework
for resolving the potential problems of economic aggregation emanating
from the institutional investor. The provisions under Section 1 of the
"Merger Act" dealing with prohibited acquisitions are directed at
mergers involving the large publicly-held industrial corporations. The
following provisions are here recommended for addition to this section:
(c) No large firm shall directly or indirectly merge with,
combine with or acquire any equity security in any
other large firm, or directly or indirectly acquire all or
the assets of a large firm or a part thereof sufficient
to constitute a large firm.
(d) This section shall not apply to firms, engaged in either
financial or non-financial trade, acquiring any voting
security solely for investment and not using the same
by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting
to bring about, control of firms in which any such voting
security is acquired.
In addition, Section 2 of the proposed Merger Act should include
the following definitions:
88 Id. at 343.
80 Id. at 33S.
99 Neal Report, supra note 15, at 3.
91 United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 597 (1957),
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(j) "Control" means the power to exercise a working con-
trol over the management or policies of a company.
Any firm, or other appropriate economic unit, which
owns beneficially, either directly or through one or
more controlled companies, more than 10 per cent of the
voting securities of a company shall be presumed to
control such company.
Working control is distinguished from absolute control,
requiring greater than 50 per cent voting stock interest,
and influence, which is based on a voting stock interest
of less than 10 per cent but includes an ability to ini-
tiate or affect some policies of the company.
Any firm which owns 10 per cent or less of the voting
securities of any company shall be presumed not to
control such company. Any such presumption of or
against control may be rebutted by evidence.
Other factors that may be taken into account in rebutt-
ing the above presumptions include, but are not limited
to, direct or indirect representation on the board of
directors, and the ability to consistently implement
major policy changes or major operational changes in
the company.
(k) The term "appropriate economic unit" is intended to
cover situations (1) where the voting securities are
held by a number of legally separate investment entities
but are under the common control of a single manage-
ment; and (2) where two or more firms exercise their
voting securities jointly by either formal or informal
arrangements.
(1) "Financial trade" is intended to include bank trust and
agency accounts, investment companies, life insurance
companies, and any other financial institution serving
in a fiduciary capacity to collect funds for the purpose
of investment. All other business would be considered
non-financial.
(m) "Voting security" means any equity security presently
entitling the owner or holder thereof to vote for the elec-
tion of directors of the company.
The basic premise of the above provisions is that the institutional
investor should be able to freely exercise its right of franchise and
influence management of its portfolio companies in furthering the
interests of the public investors which it represents. To restrict the
right to vote would have the effect of disarming the mutual funds and
20
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other institutional investors of the ultimate power, which is the basis
for any influence they might exert on management. To sterilize the
institutions' holdings would also have the effect of permitting control
by an even smaller percentage of the other outstanding voting stock.
At the same time, the above provisions attempt to provide some tangi-
ble basis for distinguishing control from influence.
Subsection 1(c) is intended to reach the problem of aggregate
concentration resulting from the combination of two large firms through
merger or acquisition, whether or not one of the parties is a "leading"
firm. It gives formal recognition to the policy guidelines announced
by Attorney General Mitchell, opposing any merger between the top
200 manufacturing firms.' By specific reference to the "financial
trade" in subsection 1(d) and a definition of that term in subsection
2(1), subsection 1(c) is made clearly applicable to acquisition of
stock in a major industrial concern by a large financial institution.
This is not clear in the "Merger Act" as originally proposed. The Act
defines a "large firm" as one with sales in excess of $500 million or
assets in excess of $250 million. Asset size would be the principal
test for financial institutions, and under this test about 120 bank
trust companies and 50 investment companies would have qualified as
large firms at the 1967 year-end.
Subsection 1(d), expanding on a provision of the "Merger Act,"
makes the provisions of the act inapplicable to both financial and
non-financial companies which acquire voting securities as part of
ther investment activities and abstain from exercising control in their
portfolio companies. While this provision is based on language of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it omits the requirement of establishing
that the merger will cause the "substantial lessening of competition."
The new provision is based on the concept that a merger of major
corporations is likely to have anticompetitive results and does not
require the "factual and theoretical judgments" to support a "sub-
stantial lessening of competition."
The key to this provision is the term "control" and its definition
in subsection 2(j). A presumption of control would arise when more
than 10 per cent of the voting shares of a company is held. The 10
per cent standard, as the minimum voting power for exercising working
92 While the provisions of the Neal Report will reach beyond the top 200 industrial
corporations, its scope with the proposed amendments is significantly less than that
recommended by the Patman Report. The Patman Report proposes to prohibit "any
bank trust department (from) holding in the aggregate in all capacities more than 10
per cent of any class of stock of any corporation required to be registered with the
Securities & Exchange Commission." Patman Report, supra note 1, at 9. The 10%
restriction, therefore, would apply to all corporations listed on the American and New
York Stock Exchanges, as well as many corporations whose securities are traded over
the counter.
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control over a portfolio company, appears to be more realistic than
the 25 per cent standard of the 1940 Act." Particularly where major
industrial corporations with widely-dispersed stock are involved, the
10 per cent standard reflects the prevailing view as to the appropriate
dividing line between influence and control." However, the presump-
tion either for or against control can be overcome by evidence to the
contrary. The rebuttable presumption provides a necessary quality of
flexibility to the standard. For example, a firm holding 8 per cent of
the voting shares of a portfolio company might, in fact, have working
control of the company by virtue of the apathy of the other stock-
holders. Conversely, a bank trust company holding 15 per cent of the
voting shares of a portfolio company may have acquired the shares
acting as trustee of an estate and, at the time of the acquisition, had
decided as a matter of policy not to exercise its voting rights or to
participate in the affairs of the company.
Two significant indicators of working control, representation on
the board of directors and the ability to consistently affect major
company policies, are specifically made considerations in overcoming
the presumptions of or against control. Board representation sup-
porting the existence of control may be direct, where the director is
affiliated with the stockholder or had the stockholder's voting support
at his election, or indirect, where the director is sympathetic to the
views of the stockholder although the ties between the two are tenuous.
But board representation itself is not determinative unless the stock-
holder has exercised his power and manifested an ability to con-
sistently affect major policy decisions. Consideration of this element
of consistency is important because the ability of the institutional
investor to occasionally influence or advise management ought not
to be curtailed. The parties are not precluded, of course, from intro-
ducing other factors which bear on the determination of control.
The term "appropriate economic unit" is introduced into sub-
section 2 (j) and defined in 2(k) to bring within the scope of the Act
such functional entities as the mutual fund complex. As noted pre-
viously, the fund complex is frequently the appropriate unit for mea-
suring voting strength, but it is not recognized as such in the 1940
Act. This proposed provision is directed at any structure, similar to
the mutual fund complex, in which the investment securities of several
legally independent entities are pooled in measuring the extent of
voting power, because of the common control of voting rights by a
93 See p. 8 supra.
94 Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. Law. 289,
315 (1968); Lamer, Ownership & Control in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations,
1929 and 1963, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 779 (1966); Disclosure to Investors, A Re-
appraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34- Acts [The Wheat
Report], 246, Appendix VI-1, 7 (CCH).
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single management. For example, bank trust companies may manage
and exercise the voting rights of private trust accounts, agency ac-
counts, pension plans and endowments, among others, and while each
of these accounts may constitute separate legal entities, their invest-
ments in voting securities are controlled by the management of one
institution. Furthermore, control may be based on the holdings of two
or more independent institutions when they act jointly in the exercise
of their voting rights. A large mutual fund and a bank trust company
may wish representation on the board of a large portfolio company
by individuals who are sympathetic to their views. The financial in-
stitutions, by joining forces, could easily acquire working control of
many industrial concerns. The purpose of this provision is to discour-
age such joint undertakings.
The limitations imposed on investments by financial institutions
in major corporations by the proposed legislation, in addition to pre-
cluding anticompetitive economic concentration, would make available
new capital to foster the growth of small and medium corporations,
thereby further enhancing competition. With the growing demand
for new investment opportunities and the increase in outstanding
shares of major corporations failing to keep pace with this demand,
financial institutions will be forced to invest an increasing share of
their assets in other than "blue-chip" securities. There is little need
for concern about impairing the ability of large firms to raise capital.
The major industrial corporations, particularly those listed on a major
stock exchange, have access to the public market for issuing their
equity and bonds, as well as the use of privately-placed loans and in-
ternally generated capital.
CONCLUSION
The dividing line between legitimate influence and anticompetitive
control in the relationship of financial institutions to their portfolio
companies is difficult to ascertain. It is also difficult to restrict control
without infringing upon the desirable exercise of influence. It is sub-
mitted that the proposals made above provide both realistic criteria
for distinguishing control from influence and sufficient flexibility to
balance the conflicting objectives. They would permit the full utiliza-
tion of the resources of the financial institutions without undermining
the competitive structure of the market place.
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TABLE 2
Per Cent of Voting Securities
of Top 100 Corps. Held by Top
10 Funds and Complexes
Per Cent of Top Corps, with
Voting Shares Held, as Indicated
in 1st Column
less than 5% 62%
5% or more 38%
7% or more 25%
8% or more 19%
10% or more 8%
15% or more 1%
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